serve the political and economic interests of many differently positioned actors, there is broad enthusiasm for their development.
As certification has become increasingly prevalent, a stream of research has begun to examine competition among ecocertification standards and the implications of selection among alternatives by primary producers, processors, and retailers. Cashore et al.'s (2004) study of forest certification actors' selection among alternative so-called non-state market-driven governance arrangements is relevant here. Specifically, their research aims to understand processes through which the environmental organization-backed certification option competes with the industrysponsored program (see also Overdevest, 2004) . In the specific case of bananas, Jansen's (2004) comparative study of ecolabeling commitments by Dole and Chiquita in Honduras concludes that the firms' choices of distinct forms of ecocertification can be understood to be functions of the intersection between external pressures and internal strategies of the firm. Based largely on interview data, he finds that the two certification schemes foster different technical change trajectories, which translates into differences in environmental outcomes. Although generating important insights as to the ecology of certification, Cashore et al. (2004) and Jansen (2004) do not develop field-level data on natural resources management and mismanagement.
Ecolabeling is an increasingly visible part of daily life in industrialized countries and a topic of substantial interdisciplinary scholarship, but empirical research on the effectiveness of these initiatives is highly limited. A review of available evidence of the resource conservation benefits of ecolabeling by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) concluded that it is "too early or too difficult" to evaluate the environmental effects of ecolabeling because "data relating to the environmental benefits achieved through eco-labelling is lacking" (OECD, 1997 ). This conclusion is reinforced by noting that of the 24 papers published in the proceedings of the 2002 "Ecolabels and the Greening of the Food Market" conference at Tufts University (Lockeretz, 2002) , only 3 were grouped under the heading of "Ecolabels and Agriculture Production Techniques." Of these 3, none empirically analyzed the extent to which ecocertification conserves or fails to conserve natural resources.
Given the tendency toward reliance on institutional arrangements other than the state for socioeconomic coordination (Allaire & Wolf, 2004 )-utilization of commercial incentives and norms to motivate compliance with resource conservation standards-and corresponding proliferation of ecocertification in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and ecotourism-an important empirical question arises: Does ecocertification conserve natural resources, or is this a case of "greenwashing"? We address this question in this article through an assessment of banana production in Ecuador conducted in 2003. We compare field-and farm-level production practices of paired samples of certified and uncertified plantations to evaluate ecological risk reduction under certification. Ecological risk reduction is defined here as the product of the application of farming practices, worker training, and management routines aimed at eco-efficiency and mitigation of resource degradation. Risk reduction results from adoption of conservation practices (e.g., riparian buffer strips), as well as nonadoption of widely employed resource-degrading practices (e.g., prophylactic use of nematocides).
Bananas, as the fifth largest agricultural commodity traded in the world, and Ecuador, as the world's leading banana exporter, suggest that this case provides a useful lens through which to consider this global phenomenon. The audit of farm Melo, Wolf / EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF production practices we present allows us to evaluate the claims of certified producers and certification bodies. Findings support assessment of the meaning of certification at the level of production and, by extension, implications for environmental and human health. Our results inform understanding of the significance of ecolabeling initiatives as a conservation tool and the larger policy question of how market-based approaches to conservation can complement or substitute for statebased regulation.
In the following section, we situate our analysis of conservation benefits of ecocertification in the context of international political economy. We then describe the social and environmental relations that define contemporary Ecuadorian banana production. Research methods and field survey data are presented, followed by discussion of results and a consideration of policy significance.
ECOLABELING AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
In 1992, the United Nations (1993) called for global sustainable development through trade. Their assumption was that economic development and increases in material standards of living can occur in a way that can be environmentally sustainable. The natural resources costs traditionally associated with increased economic activity-pollution, ecological simplification, reductions in stocks of nonrenewable resources-can be avoided, and thus a win-win outcome can be achieved. At the same time, the traditional system of state-based (i.e., governmental) environmental regulation was being challenged as ineffective, excessively expensive, and overly litigious (Kettl, 2002; Mazmanian & Kraft, 1999) . It was argued that the economic cost of implementing the legally required measures and enforcing compliance diminished the economic competitiveness of local firms and national economies (Dryzek, 1997; Hausker, 1999) . Furthermore, the state-based model of command and control was seen as failing to spur efficiency-enhancing innovation and investment in creative responses to problems of sustainability (Porter & van der Linde, 1995) .
Irrespective of the validity of these critiques, advocates of state-based environmental regulation realized that laws could not be enforced beyond the physical and legal boundaries that define a nation. In an era of increasing global economic integration and growing recognition of the transnational character of environmental problems such as deforestation, biodiversity decline, and climate change, interest in mechanisms to influence natural resource use and misuse in the home countries of rich nations' trading partners grew. There was particular interest in institutional mechanisms to enhance conservation in the ecologically rich and socioeconomically poor countries of the global south.
Earlier enthusiasm for policy instruments such as debt-for-nature swaps, bioprospecting, and establishment of networks of parks and protected areas gave way to recognition that demand for hard currency through exports and local employment limited opportunities for conservation. In part due to recognition of these limitations, attention became focused on sustaining multifunctional landscapes, a development model in which land is managed to simultaneously produce return on investment, food, jobs, rural development, environmental services, and ecological integrity.
Because free trade rules promulgated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) during this same period made it illegal for countries to block or tax imports from countries that lack legal protections for the environment, there was a need to develop new mechanisms to influence resource management behaviors at a dis- tance (Constance & Bonanno, 2000; Joshi, 2004; Ward, 1997) . The need for such tools was amplified by the fact that during this time, neoliberal reforms (i.e., deregulation and a general liberalization of commerce) led to the dismantling of regulatory infrastructure governing many industrial sectors and many nations (Barbier, 2000; Karlsson, 2004; McCarthy & Prudham, 2004) . States around the world were rolling back regulatory standards and environmental conservation infrastructure in an effort to spur economic growth and industrial competitiveness. For example, in the case of Ecuadorian bananas, the national law and administrative body governing markets and natural resource conservation was largely abolished in reforms in 1998.
In this political economy context, we observe the emergence of a new environmental conservation strategy. This new approach seeks to utilize economic actors' self-interest and market competition to enhance environmental performance of businesses. By aligning individuals' incentives with interests of an increasingly environmentally aware public, these initiatives ostensibly contribute to sustainable development. The role of nongovernmental organizations should not be overlooked in the process of harmonizing public and private interests. Eco-certification creates an opportunity for environmental advocacy organizations to develop positive working relationships with industry. These environmental groups serve as third-party auditors and endorsers, putting pressure on industry to enhance stewardship and at the same time conferring legitimacy on these same firms. Through these arrangements, environmental advocacy organizations and commercial firms are departing from their historical position of mutual antagonists and developing new ways of addressing environmental problems unresolved by state-based regulations (Boström, 2003; Crichlow, 2003; Watts, 2002) . Of course, alliances between environmental organizations and industry have been criticized as an example of co-optation of critics of capitalism (Dryzek, 1997) . Given this ambiguity, the diverse and changing roles of civil society organizations in environmental regulation is an important frontier issue in conservation studies.
Although some certification systems have been put in place by national governments (i.e., Swedish Environmental Choice, the German Blue Angel, the Nordic Swan, the Canadian Environmental Choice Program), the most widely recognized certification schemes are products of civil society organizations, for example, Forest Stewardship Council and the Marine Stewardship Council. Rainforest Alliance and the social justice movements grouped under the Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International (Fairtrade) are two of the leading certification bodies engaging banana production (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], 2000) .
THE BANANA INDUSTRY IN ECUADOR
Fourteen million metric tons (Mt) of bananas were traded globally in 2000, 71% of which were produced in Ecuador, Costa Rica, Colombia, Philippines, and Guatemala. Ecuador produces 28% of total exports (FAO, 2003) . In Ecuador, 28,619 producers maintain 189,331 hectares (ha) in banana production (Agriculture Information System of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock [SICA], 2003) . One hundred thirty thousand workers are employed on plantations (United Nations Environmental Programme [UNEP], 2002), and 1.1 million people benefit directly or indirectly (out of a population of 12.5 million; FAO, 2001 , Ecuador produced 4,199,156 Mt (FAO, 2003 . The banana trade accounts for 22% of Ecuadorian exports, second only to oil (UNEP, 2002) . Although almost all land dedi-cated to bananas in Ecuador is owned by Ecuadorians or companies supported by Ecuadorian capital (Striffler, 2002) , the vast majority of bananas are produced under contract with one of five transnational companies (Dole, Chiquita, Del Monte, Fyffes, and Bonita) or their Ecuadorian subsidiaries (UNEP, 2002) . This structure points directly to vital interdependencies between Ecuador, bananas, and international capital.
In general, the environmental behavior of the industry is loosely regulated. As a by-product of neoliberal reform (McCarthy & Prudham, 2004) , in 1998 the Banana National Program (BNP), which had up to that time been responsible for regulation, monitoring, and enforcement in banana production, was suppressed (UNEP, 2002) and replaced by the Banana National Council. This newly created institution is charged with policy coordination, development of the industry, and establishment of the referential price, but it is not charged with monitoring or enforcement functions at the level of production (UNEP, 2002) . UNEP concluded that although some of the agricultural extension services provided by the BNP have been assumed by exporters and producer unions, the "functions relating to the creation and implementation of controls and monitoring are still missing," and "many producers do not comply with the existing standards and regulations" (UNEP, 2002) .
1
Although data from Ecuador are sparse, it is widely acknowledged that commercial banana farming is a high-input monoculture that exerts a heavy ecological toll (Barbier, 2000; Clay, 2004) . Banana monocultures have replaced highly diverse ecosystems, with large surfaces dedicated to a narrow set of cultivars related to the Cavendish variety. To maintain consistently high rates of production and uniform quality, contemporary banana cultivation is premised on intensive use of pesticides, fertilizers, and irrigation, generating on-site and off-site degradation (Colburn, 1997; Henriques, Jeffers, Lacher, & Kendall, 1997; Muños-Carpena, Ritter, Socorro, & Perez, 2002; Stern, 1999; UNEP, 2001) . Organic and inorganic wastes stemming from production and processing pose additional risks to people and ecosystems (Matlock, Rogers, Edwards, & Martin, 2002; Mortensen et al., 1998) .
Rainforest Alliance and the organizations grouped under Fairtrade are the two leading certifiers of bananas in Ecuador. Organic agricultural certification was not considered in this study, as only 1 independent plantation was reportedly certified as organic at the time of this study.
2 In 2002, Rainforest Alliance was certifying 32 large farms (more than 50 ha) owned by Reybanpac C.A. (suppliers of Chiquita Banana). These farms controlled 9,124 ha (Rainforest Alliance, unpublished). Fairtrade was certifying 1 plantation and 3 cooperatives of small holders (less than 50 ha) (Fairtrade, unpublished) . The largest of these cooperatives had 340 producer-members controlling a total of 2,000 ha (Redaccion Machala, 2004) .
METHOD

Agroecological Assessment
This research seeks to compare the risk-reduction levels of certified operations relative to practices of noncertified operations. Ecological risk reduction is achieved through selection of production technology and investment in practices and organizational routines that prevent and mitigate environmental degradation. Although neither Rainforest Alliance nor Fairtrade explicitly screen applicants by 292 ORGANIZATION & ENVIRONMENT / September 2005 farm size, in practice, large certified farms are aligned with the former and small farms with the latter. Because farm size is highly correlated with capitalization and level of technology, there is little meaning in a comparison of risk reduction across the two leading certification organizations. The two programs service discrete population segments. Thus, the relevant analysis is based on paired comparison; Rainforest Alliance certified farms compared to large noncertified farms, and Fairtrade certified farms compared to small noncertified farms.
To evaluate the extent to which certified farms differ from uncertified farms in ways relevant for conservation, there is a need to define appropriate and practical indicators. The categories of risk evaluated, and the specific production practices audited in the field, were derived from a model of banana production that identifies inputs and outputs of production and packing linked to resource degradation (see Figure 1a and 1b). This general agroecological model informed our review of empirical literature on banana-specific interactions with natural resources (see Table 1 ). This process allowed us to derive four general categories of natural resource degradation risk: land management (LM), water quality management (WQ), agrochemical management (AM), and waste management (WM). These four types of risk served to structure the farm practices audits in the field. We note that our study specifically addresses the ecological significance of certification, and thus we chose not to focus on workers' health, public health or other categories of risk.
Ecological Risk-Reduction Indices
Based on procedures described above, we identified a set of 29 practices (i.e., technologies, investments in infrastructure and human capital, and organizational and management routines) that contribute to ecological risks and ecological risk reductions. Detailed assessment of these 29 practices allowed us to compile a riskreduction score for each of the four risk categories (LM, WQ, AM, WM) on each farm. Combining these four indices allows us to express a measure of total risk reduction (TRR) for each farm. See Table 2 for a list of all practices and variables used to define this set of five risk-reduction indices. See Table 3 for construction of the five indices. In presenting our results, we express risk reduction as a percentage of maximum possible risk reduction, as defined by the relevant index. In effect, we have normalized all reported scores on a scale of 0-1, with a 1 being equivalent to maximum possible risk reduction as defined in Table 3 .
In several instances, a specific farming practice audited in the field is included as a component of more than one risk reduction index. In effect, we are double counting those practices that contribute to more than one risk-reduction category, as they deserve to exert more weight on the overall risk-reduction score of a given producer than practices with more limited ecological implications. Recognizing that this methodological decision raises questions, we calculated risk-reduction scores for all producers based on modified algorithms in which all farm practices audited exert equal weight on aggregate risk-reduction scores. 3 We then compared these modified risk-reduction scores to those based on original indices as defined in Table 3 . High correlations between original and modified scores for each of the affected indices-AM (0.982, p value = .000), WQ (0.985, p value = .000), WM (0.985, p value = .000), and TRR (0.989, p value = .000)-indicate that the methodological choice to double count a subset of audited practices has little if any bearing on our research findings.
The assessment criteria that structure our field audit of production practices display considerable overlap with ecocertification standards. Tables included in the appendix compare the two certification schemes featured in our study (Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance) and current Ecuadorian law for each of the four categories of risk we identify. This information allows readers to evaluate overlap among these three standards and the relationship between these sets of standards and the risk-reduction measures employed in the present study (see Table 2 ). We view this overlap as interesting and important, and we will return to this question in our discussion of research results. a. Castillo, Rupert, and Solis (2000) . b. Chambron (1999) . c. Clay (2004) . d. Colburn (1997) . e. Henriques, Jeffers, Lacher, and Kendall (1997) . f. Jeger, Waller, Johanson, and Gowen (1996) . g. Matlock, Rogers, Edwards, and Martin (2002) . h. Mortensen et al. (1998) . i. Muños-Carpena, Ritter, Socorro, and Perez (2002) . j. Stern (1999) . k. United Nations Environmental Programme (2002).
Study Site
The study was conducted in the western lowlands of Ecuador during the summer months of 2003. Fieldwork was conducted in the provinces of Los Rios, Guayas, El Oro, Canar, and Azuay. This region accounts for 81% of the total acreage dedicated to bananas in Ecuador (SICA, 2003) . Farm practices inventory of the 29 relevant indicators was executed on 47 farms through a semistructured interview with the owner or manager and field inspection of all relevant facilities. The semistructured interview focused on enterprise characteristics, farming practices (e.g., land use, water management, agrochemical management), farm administra- a. LM = land management; AM = agrochemical management; WM = waste management; WQ = water quality management; GD = general descriptor. b. Binary = 1 for presence of risk-reduction measure or practice, 0 for absence; Categorical = 1 for practice linked to highest risk reduction (e.g., cultural control of weeds), .5 for intermediate-level practice (i.e., legal use of herbicides), 0 for most risky practice (e.g., used of banned herbicide); Continuous = value between 1 (maximum value) and 0 (minimum value).
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tion, supervision of workers and facilities, and environmental conservation. The interviews were conducted by the article's first author in Spanish and took, on average, about 90 minutes. Field inspection was structured through a checklist and served to validate and clarify data from interviews on farm organization, infrastructure, and technical practices. Although it was not possible, we note that under ideal circumstances two or more evaluators would have independently audited production practices to enhance data reliability.
Sampling
Sampling of certified farms was achieved through contact with relevant coordinating organizations. El Guabo Association of Small Banana Producers, which represents Fairtrade-certified producers, and Ecuador's Rainforest Alliance partner, Conservation and Development (Conservación y Desarrollo), provided sample frames from which to draw a random sample of certified farms.
No reliable sample frames exist for noncertified banana producers in Ecuador. Small producers are particularly difficult to identify and contact in a systematic way. Beyond technical constraints to developing a random sample, there is deep suspicion of outsiders in the banana business, as there has been a series of recent scandalous reports of child labor on Ecuadorian banana farms (Human Rights Watch, 2002) . In addition, in 2003 there was a series of series of national strikes around banana prices and considerable civil unrest (Redacción Guayaquil, 2003) . These events ensured low enthusiasm for responding to researchers' questions. On this basis, a snowball sampling method was used to identify noncertified farms. Starting with two prominent and receptive growers, through personal referrals we were able to identify a set of large and small noncertified producers willing to participate in the study. These procedures yielded a sample of 13 Fairtrade-certified farms and a comparison group of 9 noncertified farms of less than 50 ha (small) and a sample of 10 Rainforest Alliance-certified farms and a comparison group of 14 farms greater than 50 ha (large).
Inability to generate a random sample of noncertified farms introduces a potential bias, as owners agreeing to be interviewed presumably are more progressive and less likely to be out of compliance with national laws. Thus, our data on practices of noncertified farms should be interpreted conservatively. It is likely that our Melo, Wolf / EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF ECO-CERTIFICATION 297 sample includes more farms in the high part of the risk-reduction distribution than would be the case under random sampling. As we will see, this methodological weakness does not importantly affect our results.
Statistical Analysis
Nonparametric Mann Whitney U tests were used to establish the statistical significance (α = .05) of differences between risk-reduction scores of paired comparison groups (Ryan & Joiner, 2001 ). This test relies on median values and was chosen because the data from certified farms are highly skewed, and the samples are relatively small. Under such conditions, the median is considered as a more appropriate representation of the population (Ott & Longnecker, 2001 ).
RESULTS
Our study design supports comparison of certified farms to noncertified farms of similar size (Fairtrade-certified small vs. noncertified small, and Rainforest Alliance-certified large vs. noncertified large). Although it is interesting to reflect on relative risk-reduction scores of farms certified under these two programs (and to ask which of these schemes is linked to higher risk reduction), we believe that observed differences across the certification schemes stem most notably from access to capital and level of technology rather than some essential difference between the two certification initiatives.
Land Management (LM)
Certified farms have higher LM risk-reduction scores than noncertified farms (see Figure 2) . The median certified small farms score is 1.0, relative to .25 for noncertified small farms. The median score for certified large farms is .65, relative to .25 for noncertified large farms. These differences are statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p < .0002 for small farms, p < .0000 for large farms). The distributions of LM risk-reduction scores for certified farms are clearly and consistently higher than those of noncertified farms. At the level of individual LM index components, the frequency and intensity of farms dedicating land to vegetative barriers or riparian buffer zones (VBF) is markedly different on certified and uncertified farms. All certified farms had buffer zones or vegetative barriers in place, but only .12 of noncertified plantations engage in this practice. The average vegetative barrier/plantation ratio (RVS) in a noncertified farm is .01 of the total farm surface, as compared with an average of .14 RVS for large certified farms and .57 RVS for small certified farms. We note that certification is not correlated with halting conversion of virgin forest to banana cultivation, as all farms in the study are established in areas long used for agriculture, and there is no such conversion happening in the study area due to market conditions.
Water Quality (WQ)
Certified farms consistently have higher WQ risk-reduction scores than noncertified farms (see Figure 3) . The median certified small farm score is .82, relative to .46 for noncertified small farms. The median certified large farm score is .73, relative to .27 for noncertified large farms. These differences are statistically significant (p < .0001 for small farms and p < .0000 for large farms).
Analysis of WQ on these farms highlights a correlation between certification and pollution prevention. There are two pollutants of concern associated with effluent from processing sheds, organic waste from preparing and cleaning bananas, and the post-harvest treatment residuals (i.e., fungicide residuals). According to both sets of certification norms and Ecuadorian law, processing facilities on all farms should have in place solid and latex filtering and retention systems (SLR) and a sand-gravel-charcoal filtering mechanism to collect residuals. These investments avoid direct release of organic waste and fungicides to watercourses. However, Fairtrade norms suggest another approach. They recommend that fungicides should be phased out of the PHT of fruit, hence avoiding the cost of constructing and servicing a residuals.
Survey results indicate that large certified farms employ a conventional end-ofpipe approach. All of them were observed to have in place SLR and PHT mechanisms. On the other hand, 54% small certified farmers have already built a SLR, and 46% are in the process of building them. Nevertheless, none of them had plans to build PHT. Rather, 73% of them have replaced the post-harvest fungicides thiabendazole or imazalil for an organic product that is believed to pose lower ecological risk. Due to the lack of information about the ecological risk of this alternative fungicide, we treat the organic product as equivalent to conventional fungicides. However, this willingness to implement alternative measures is worth mentioning and contrasts starkly with practice on noncertified farms. One hundred percent of noncertified farms lack both SLR and PHT, and all of them use fungicides in their postharvest treatment.
Agrochemical Management (AM)
Certified farms' AM is significantly different than that of noncertified farms (see Figure 4) . The median certified small farm risk-reduction score is .92, compared with .41 for noncertified small farms. The median certified large farm score is .86, compared with .36 for noncertified large farms. These differences are statistically significant (p < .0001 for small and p < .0000 for large farms). The distributions do not overlap highlighting the magnitude and consistency of observed differences between these populations.
These data indicate that certified producers use agrochemicals differently from noncertified producers. For example, Fairtrade certification requires that farms use no herbicides, and in fact no certified small farm was observed to use them. In contrast, the use of herbicides is widespread on noncertified small farms (100% of them reported using chemical herbicides). Rainforest Alliance enforces a ban on the herbicide paraquat, 4 and certified large farms were not observed to be using this product. In contrast, 53% of noncertified large farms reported using paraquatbased herbicides. Therefore, it seems likely that certified farms choose production methods with an awareness of their obligations under certification, whereas noncertified farms select on the basis of price and efficacy.
A second important difference in practices reflected in the aggregate AM riskreduction score relates to integrated pest management. Certified farms are far more likely to rely on analytic and diagnostic procedures before using agrochemicals (e.g., pest scouting, economic thresholds), pesticide record keeping, and pestmanagement training for farm workers. These techniques can enhance efficiency of the farm operation and reduce risks to workers and the environment. 
Waste Management (WM)
Certified farms consistently have higher WM risk-reduction scores than noncertified (see Figure 5 ). The median for certified small farms is 1.0 versus .67 for noncertified small farms. The median for certified large farms is also 1.0, as compared to .33 for noncertified large farms. No significance test was performed because all certified farms achieved the maximum possible score.
In terms of organic waste, 100% of certified farms and 88% of the noncertified farms surveyed reported having a secondary market for bananas that did not meet export grade. When it comes to managing banana stalks, 62% of the noncertified farmers engage in the recommended practice of returning the stalks to the plantation (the remaining 37% of respondents dump the stalks elsewhere). All certified farms reported returning stalks to the fields to replace organic matter.
The inorganic waste of consequence in banana production is plastic used for tethering plants and covering banana bunches in the field. Lack of local waste management facilities, costs of transportation, and the underdeveloped nature of the local plastic recycling industry imply that producers must incur significant costs in avoiding the common practices of open burning or random disposal on property boundaries. We observe that only 16% of noncertified producers engage in adequate disposal practices, as compared to 100% of certified farms.
Total Risk Reduction (TRR)
TRR score is an integrative, summary measure calculated by aggregating the four previous indices. Certified farms consistently have higher scores than do noncertified (see Table 4 ). The median certified small farm score is .91 as compared to .46 for noncertified small farms. The median certified large farm score is .78 total versus .34 for noncertified farms. The differences are statistically significant (p < .0001 for small farms and p < .0000 for large farms).
The distribution of the scores of certified and noncertified farms do not overlap, with a gap of .19 between the maximum score of a noncertified small farm and the minimum score of a certified small farm (see Figure 6 ). The gap between certified large farms and noncertified large farms is .20. Thus, there is clear reason to believe that certified operations will have a lower environmental impact than comparable noncertified operations. We note not only that aggregate risk reduction is higher on both large and small certified farms, but also that certified farms demonstrate higher risk reduction scores on all components this master index.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This research is motivated by the lack of empirical evidence on the ecological effects of ecolabeling, the challenges to state-based environmental regulation posed by global trade integration, and the increasing reliance on market-based incentives to achieve public policy objectives. We compare production practices and environmental conservation investments of paired samples of certified and noncertified banana farms in Ecuador and evaluate risk reduction applied to land management, water quality, agrochemical management, and waste management.
Certified farms exhibited relatively complex and comprehensive environmental management systems. In contrast, noncertified farms exhibit uneven and unstructured adoption of best management practices. Our results indicate that both large and small certified farms exhibit higher risk reduction than comparable noncertified farms. The differences in practices are dramatic in that the lowest-scoring certified farm (of any size) had a higher risk-reduction score than the highest scoring noncertified farm. Our results support the claim that ecolabels serve to distin- guish operations that have made investments in mitigating environmental degradation associated with standard industrial models of production. In considering our results, the cross-sectional nature of these data makes it impossible to test causality between ecocertification and evolution of farm practices. We do not have data to understand if farms made investments to become certified or if certification has simply been awarded to the strata of farms engaged in socially appealing practices. Further research is needed to study if and how certification motivates investment and catalyzes innovation that pushes the distribution of technical practice toward sustainability. There is a need to understand dynamics among producers, agribusiness, markets, ecocertification systems, and the environment. Also in considering limitations of this study, because the samples are small and the noncertified producers were not selected to participate at random, there is obvious interest in collecting more and better data. The potential bias introduced due to methodological constraints would, however, most likely lead to upward bias in risk-reduction scores of noncertified farms. Given the dramatic separation we observed between certified and noncertified farms using snowball sampling for the control group, correcting for this shortcoming would not add much value to the study. Last, reliance on a single auditor rather than the preferred multiple evaluator method should be recognized as a limitation of these data.
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As reflected in the appendix, the overlap in standards among the two ecocertification schemes, Ecuadorian national law, and the assessment criteria we derive from relevant agroecological literature suggests that policy interventionswhether they be legal codes or ecocertification schemes promoted by nongovernment organizations and commercial firms-are, to a greater or lesser extent, science based. The accountability criteria articulated by policy makers are consistent with general scientific understanding; thus, there is general agreement as to which ecological resources are at risk and which categories of activities in agricultural production systems should be regulated.
We conclude that ecocertification schemes and bodies of national law derive legitimacy from linking themselves to sets of concerns identified as problematic by ecological science (e.g., water quality degradation, alteration of habitat, release of agrochemicals, waste management). Whether policy instruments address these concerns in an ambitious and meaningful way is not clear from consideration of the standards alone. General agreement as to relevant categories of risk must be distinguished from specific agreement as to which production behaviors are acceptable and which are unacceptable. How high the regulatory bar should be set does not follow from agreement as to the categories of concern. Thus, greenwashing by political and economic actors can take the form of unwillingness to engage the issues linked to the greatest ecological risks or the form of addressing these issues in only a superficial way. Our study shows that ecocertified producers and ecocertification bodies are addressing the most meaningful ecological risks. As to how meaningfully they engage these issues, we report important differences in technical practices that are linked to conservation benefits. Our study is not, however, a definitive assessment, and more research is needed.
In addition to highlighting superior conservation practices of ecocertified farms relative to noncertified farms, our findings point to breakdown in enforcement of domestic environmental laws. It is quite likely that barriers to technical assistance, capital, and other resources needed to upgrade practices of noncertified operations interact with a lack of credible enforcement threat to sustain forms of agriculture that degrade ecological structure and functions. The suppression of the BNP has created an institutional failure, in that the monitoring and regulation of the banana industry is incoherent. More generally, we can suggest that neoliberal reforms that reduced state capacity to coordinate development without ensuring some alternative institutional response also constitute institutional failures (UNEP, 2002) .
Regarding social justice considerations, important arguments have been made regarding ways in which ecolabeling may serve the interests of large farms and nonfarm agribusinesses to the disadvantage of small, poor producers (Murray & Raynolds, 2000; Raynolds, 2000) . The study does not provide evidence to support or dismiss claims that ecocertification is environmentally progressive yet socially regressive (Bray et al., 2002) . This study did find, however, that socially oriented certification (Fairtrade) and ecologically oriented certification (Rainforest Alliance) can coexist, and both make contributions to environmental conservation. We observe complementarity through a functional division of labor, as Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance certify different kinds of farms and perhaps appeal to different kinds of consumers.
Our findings suggest that ecocertification could potentially raise standards of environmental conservation practice more effectively than domestic law in countries such as Ecuador. It should be noted, however, that certification is a tool that applies currently only to a small minority of the population of producers. Eco-certification potentially has no significance for the majority of producers who do not have resources or interest in innovating. The majority of producers will either continue to farm as noncertified producers, or in an alternative future they will go out of business. Both scenarios have costs.
Consequently, we come to recognize a need for institutional plurality (Allaire & Wolf, 2004) . In addition to support for diverse certification schemes, there is continued need for state engagement in regulation and development of natural resource-based industries. The state must define and effectively enforce minimum compliance with environmental standards, and investments should be made to help producers achieve these standards. Our research findings suggest that the greatest opportunities to improve noncertified producers' practices lies in agrochemical management and water quality, as both large and small noncertified producers exhibited marked weakness on these criteria. The state, of course, is also fully relevant to continuous improvement of resource conservation practice on certified farms, as threat of regulation and enforcement plays an important role in motivating voluntary initiatives such as ecocertification. frequency, and date is required. (15) required. (3.5.8, 3.5.9, 3.5 Pesticide application companies and The training must increase the workers' awareness of -banana producers must publish agrochemical danger, health issues, and first aid. 
APPENDIX
Comparison of Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance Eco-certification Standards and Ecuadorian National Law According to Four Categories of Ecological Risk
